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Reply to Joseph Ellin's Of All Professions,
Prostitution is the Oldest (Except Possibly for
Teaching)
Michael Davis
Joe Ellin's commentary on "Of All Professions, Begging is the
Best" illustrates both the strengths and the weakness of what I called
the "Cartesian method". Among the strengths is that, without leaving his desk or consulting any other person, Ellin has been able to tell us a
good deal about how "profession" might be used, about what
libertarians might think, say, or do, and even about what might be true
of professions. Among the weaknesses of the Cartesian method Ellin's
commentary illustrates is, however, an inability to undermine, or even
understand the power, of what I called the Socratic method. Indeed, his
argument rests on an obvious fallacy. He seeks to move from what
might be true to what is true. That form of argument is a respectable
way to refute logical claims. ("Imagine a space in which parallel lines
cross" is a way to disprove the Euclidian axiom concerning parallel
lines.) But imagining what could or might be is no way to disprove an
empirical claim. ("All swans are white" might be true----or false-no
matter how many red, green, or mauve swans we imagine.) And my
main claim about what professions are (their complex connection with
morality) is an empirical claim (though, as I shall explain, a special sort
of empirical claim). Not all philosophy is a priori; much philosophy,
such as the philosophy oflaw or the philosophy of biology, is
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contingent on the empirical claims (what those involved with law or
biology claim about the practice of law or biology).
My talk was not, therefore, an exercise in lexicography or
language analysis. I was not trying to describe how the word
"profession" is in fact used (its "one central definition", as Ellin called
it). I was not seeking ''the concept" (the most general guide to usage).
Rather, I was engaged in trying to understand a certain use of
"profession" (a conception rather than the concept), the use people
calling themselves "members of a profession" make of the term when
they are speaking carefully about their common project. That is why I
distinguished and dismissed several common senses of "profession"
before reaching the admittedly specialized sense on which I focused.
Much of Ellin's ruminations on how "profession" is used are therefore
strictly irrelevant (however accurate).
Consider an analogy with money. There may well be one
central definition of money, say, "any means of exchange". Money in
this sense includes coins of various kinds, bills of various
denominations, checks, negotiable bonds, and so on. Nonetheless, for
some purposes, we distinguish between "real money" and other sorts.
For example, none of us would knowingly accept payment for our
services in play money (what we happily treat as money when playing
the board game Monopoly), counterfeit money, or even lapsed
currencies (such as the Confederate dollar or Soviet ruble). Though at
least arguably money in the central sense, they are not real money, that
is, money for the end in view, receiving payment. The reason is not that
real money is valuable and the other sort is not. We sometimes refuse
38
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payment in something that we admit is valuable. For many of us,
negotiable instruments (like bearer bonds) are not "real money"
because no store will take them, though we would be treat them as
money when calculating our inheritance and an economist calculating
the "money supply" would include them. A conception of something
always sacrifices the complete description of usage--the
definition" or concept-in

"central

order to obtain a term useful for a particular

purpose, the purpose of picking out what is of interest to us then.
Conceptions are therefore always as open to controversy as a) the
purpose to which they are to be put and b) the criteria for evaluating
their usefulness. Like other tools, they are inventions or works of art,
not the linguistic equivalent of a photograph.
What special sense of profession was I interested in? I was, as I
said, trying to understand what members of professions, both actual
members of actual professions (whoever they turn out to be) and mere
supposed members of merely so-called professions (the remainder),
think about the project they take themselves to be involved in-not,

I

hasten to add, what they happen to think at a given moment (a fact
about their psychology) but what they think after careful reflection in
concert with others who make similar claims (a fact about their
common conception of profession). So, what people might say is
entirely beside the point. Even what they do say is only a beginning. I
do not, as Ellin put it, simply "count noses" (not even after selecting the
right noses). The crucial thing, what is entirely missing from Ellin's
critique, is what members of professions (and those who only think
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they are) say after such careful reflection in concert (what they say "at
their rational best").
How can I know this crucial thing? My claim to that knowledge rests
on actually engaging in (something like) the appropriate dialogue with
them in classes or workshops, at conferences, at parties, and even in
open-ended interviews.l My dialogue with members of professions has
not been-as

Ellin snidely suggests-"[mostly]

internal". I am serious

about following (what I called) the Socratic method. One sign of Ell in's
Cartesianism is that he supposes me to committed to Socrates'
metaphysics (along with his method); a metaphysics that guarantees
agreement among all rational persons whether they have the
appropriate experience or not. I have no such commitment. Another
sign of Ell in's Cartesianism is that he cannot believe a philosopher
would actually go about the world as Socrates once went about Athens.
I sympathize. Like him, I was taught philosophy at a time when ''we''
(philosophers) could not see why internal dialogue was not sufficient. If
one can defme "chicken" without asking a "chicken" for its opinion
(something we certainly can do), why not define "profession" without
asking its members what they think they are doing?
The question is not merely rhetorical. The conception of
profession I am interested in is not like the concept of chicken, or even
any of the likely conception of chicken. "Profession" (in our preferred
sense)--like

"democracy", "engineering", and ''rational''-is

a

conception having an inside as well as an outside. It describes a self-
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conscious undertaking (as well as a collection of behaviors). The test of
a Socratic definition is, it is true, in part Cartesian even when the
definition concerns "profession". The definition must satisfy
philosophical standards of clarity, coherence, and so on. But the test of
a Socratic definition is in part radically un-Cartesian, that is, that those
who seem to use "profession" to describe what they are doing
recognize the corresponding definition as describing their use. While
the internal dialogue of a philosopher at his desk can (in principle at
least) determine that the first test is satisfied, it cannot determine
whether the second is. Anyone using the Cartesian method will almost
certainly miss what is central to the conception of profession that
interests us, the way the members of profession understand what they
are doing. Ellin's method of understanding profession rests on (what
used to be called) "a category mistake"? He has treated a term
belonging to one logical category (conception with an internal point of
view as well as an external one) as if it were a term belonging to
another (conception with only an external point of view).
There is, nonetheless, much agreement between Ellin and me-and pointing it out should help to clarify the strength of the argument I
made in my talk. So, I now turn to what we agree on, though even here
there are important disagreements.

1 See, for example, my Thinking like an Engineer: Studies in the Ethics of a
Profession (Oxford University Press: New York, 1998), Ch. 9.
2 For an extensive discussion of this mistake in another context, see my
"Liberalism and/or Democracy?" Social Theory and Practice 9 (Spring 1983):
51-72.
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First, we agree that "professional" has a somewhat different use than
"member of a profession". I concluded my discussion of the Socratic
definition of profession with a characterization of professional (relying
on that conception): ''To be a 'professional'

(or 'a real pro') is to be a

member (in good standing) of the profession in question-or
analogy) to act as

(by

if one were (that is, to act in the way the relevant

standards require or, perhaps, should require)." Notice that I offer ways
to extend the use by analogy (in what I have now italicized). So, of
course, I can agree with Ellin that there can be athletes who are "real
pros" in this (extended) sense even if professional athletics are not
members of a profession (in that sense).
To say that professional athletes do not now form one or more
professions is, of course, not to say they could not. All they need do is
organize as the Socratic definition requires. Here Ellin raises the
question whether what professional athletes do or at least could do
would serve (what I call) a moral ideal. I see no reason why not, though
I do think: fmding such an ideal is not as straightforward as it is, say, for
medicine or engineering. Consider, for example, Ellin's suggestion, the
ideal of competing in physical games at a high level of skill. This is an
ideal, but not a moral ideal. Nothing about playing perfectly makes it
rational for a moral agent as such to favor anyone's competing well,
badly, or not at all. Only if one has an interest in athletics to begin with
would it be rational to favor his or others' pursuing the ideal in
question. And nothing in moral agency requires such an interest.
Behind my conception of a moral ideal is (as Ellin explicitly
notes) a conception of rational goods (what goods it is always rational
42
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to desire). All ideals are rational guides to action in the sense that
pursuing what one considers good is rational (all else equal). These
may, of course, only be "apparent [rational] goods". Some ideals are
rational in the stronger sense. The supposed good actually is good for
the one pursuing it (though perhaps not for others). We might call these
"prudential goods." Certain prudential goods are rational in an even
stronger sense, that is, they are (all else equal) what any rational person
has an interest in. Among these, presumably, are health, a good
education, safe and useful structures, accurate financial information,
andjustice. These (or at least the more important ofthese}-what
think Ellin means by "rational goods"-is,

I

however, still not

necessarily pursuing a moral ideal. Moral ideals have a connection with
morality that mere rational goods of this sort, what we might call
"primary good", need not have. Anyone's pursuing one of them is, all
else equal, good for others. So, for example, physical strength is a mere
primary good, but public health is a moral ideal (in part, of course,
because Ibenefit not only from not have a contagious disease myself
but from your also not having it). We might usefully picture this
connection between certain primary goods and morality by thinking of
morality as the work of a "moral legislature" consisting of all rational
persons laying down rules binding on all.3 Achieving the desired
distribution of certain primary goods may be possible without adopting
any particular rule. Self-interest may, for example, assure the desired

3'For a fuller explanation of this technical device, see my "The Moral
Legislature: Morality without an Archimedean Point", Ethics 102 (January
1992): 303-318.
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distribution (as it may for physical strength). The distribution, though it
can be an ideal, cannot be a moral ideal. Other primary goods may be
such that achieving the desired distribution, while possible only by
adopting a rule, is best approached by adopting a rule expressly
requiring the desired distribution. This distribution of primary goods
would be a moral requirement, not an ideal. An environment free of
serious physical violence is such an ideal. Still other primary goods
may be such that the desired distribution cannot be directly legislated.
For example, the necessary rule might impose too great a burden (as
universal altruism would), or something about the good itself might
make requiring the distribution self-defeating (as requiring everyone to
share confidences with everyone else seems to be--since universal
sharing would destroy the point of confidences). The desired
distribution of such goods may still be approximated by adopting
auxiliary rules, that is, rules making it easier than it would otherwise be
to engage in activity tending to produce the desired distribution. For
such goods, the desired distribution is a moral ideal. The connection
between the rule and the ideal provides a reason for making supporting
rules part of morality.
On this analysis, a moral ideal is a distribution of goods every
rational person wants enough to accept a significant moral burden in
exchange but not enough to accept the burden that morally requiring
the good to be provided would entail. So, for example, achieving good
health for everyone is a moral ideal in this sense. Health is certainly a
primary good and we generally benefit from the health of others. The
healthy are not a drain on us in the way the sick are, nor do they
44
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threaten contagion in the way the sick often do. Yet we are unwilling to
require each of us to help the sick, to avoid all conduct that might cause
disease, and to do whatever else might be necessary to provide that
good for everyone. The moral rules therefore include no requirement
that each do what he can to assure his own health or anyone else's, only
such auxiliary rules as prohibit sneezing on others or require us to help
a physician if our help is needed in an emergency and can be given
with minimal cost.4
So, if professional atWetics is to be a profession, it must serve
some moral ideal in this sense. Ellin's suggestion is to consider atWetes
are a category of entertainer. Like actors, magicians, jugglers, and so
on, they seek to provide amusement, relaxation, and distraction from
the cares of the day (by competing in physical games at a high level).
This strikes me as a useful way to define their moral ideal. But before I
accept it, I would want to ask professional atWetes whether they
consider themselves to be providing this good (perhaps among others).
If not, then, of course, the mere possibility of their doing so does not
make them a profession. But for now, let's assume professional atWetes
would accept this description of their work. Amusement, relaxation,
and distraction from the cares of the day seem to be rational goods
(even if not as important as primary goods like health, justice, or

This analysis of the distinction between "rational goods" and "moral ideal" is
not new but follows what I said in Profession, Code, and Ethics (Ashgate:
Aldershot, England, 2002), pp. 25-26. As used here, "moral ideal" is a term of
art (a conception). Those who wish to save the term for some other purpose
are free to substitute another. What is important is not the term itself but the
conception it names.
4
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safety). Still, that does not show that their provision is also a moral
ideal, that is, a good important enough to take on the burdens that turn a
rational good into a moral ideal. Ellin, or more likely other thinkers,
will have to provide further argument before we can conclude that good
atWetes can routinely serve a moral ideal (much less that they actually
do).

5

That brings me to the question why any occupation, not only
professional atWetics, should want to form a profession. Echoing much
sociology, Ellin seems to think that "profession" is an ''honorific'', that
is, a term convention makes an honor or sign of respect (whether
deserved or not). "Sir" or "Nobel Prize Winner" are typical honorifics.
Most honorifics simply accord honor or respect (though some, like the
Nobel Prize, come with money or other valuable things). The title
"profession" differs from typical honorifics in (according to Ellin and
many sociologists) somehow guaranteeing (or, at least, making much
more likely) higher social status, higher income, or more authority
(control over one's work). While I agree that ''profession'' (in the
relevant sense) does justify respect for the occupation so designated
(until we have reason to doubt the designation), I do not think the

My position on the possibility of a profession of prostitution would be
exactly the same. I see no reason a priori why prostitution cannot be a
profession (one committed to providing "sexual comfort"). Just that possibility
was a subject of common conversation in the Netherlands when I visited in
2007. Of course, those discussing the possibility did not regard providing
sexual comfort for money as morally wrong. Had they considered it morally
wrong, they would have had to reject the possibility of a profession of
prostitution. The list of possible professions will always be contingent on our
understanding of morality. Ellin is right to point out that that is indeed a
consequence of my analysis.
46
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connection is conventional or that it guarantees (or even makes likely)
anything in the way of status, income, or authority. Certainly, there is
no centralized body handing out the designation (in the US) or setting
the benefits to accompany the designation.
The connection between the benefits of a profession (whatever they
turn out to be) and the designation is more like that a trademark (Bayer
Aspirin or Campbell's Soup) and the goods properly sold under that
designation. The professions so called have had to earn whatever
respect we now tend to give them. The term "profession" may yet go
the way of other terms that once demanded respect but no longer do,
such as "Made in the USA" or "British engineering".

The conception

of profession I offered is, all else equal, a reason to expect a profession
(properly so called) to do more good in the world than the
corresponding (non-professional) occupation would. After all, a
profession is designed to do good beyond what law, market, morality
and public opinion would otherwise require. But the design does little
more than give us reason for hope; designs often go awry. Professions
may become "corrupt" (to use Ellin's term), that is, come to ignore
their own standards most of the time. They may simply become lax in
enforcing their standards. But, even if they maintain their standards as
strictly as humanely possible, the design for service may fail for one
reason or another. Their required education may ill fit them for the
work they do (which is why construction managers are replacing
architects on large projects); the cost of their ways of doing things may
be too high for the market to bear (which is why physicians are yielding
many routine activities to nurses, technicians, and physician's
47

The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XVII No. 1

assistants); their techniques may become outmoded (which is why we
no longer have phrenologists); and so on. What can happen to one
profession could happen to all. If the market became much closer to
perfect than it is, professions would probably disappear. The
professions would go the way of guilds. There is nothing in the
conception I offered to guarantee the existence of professions, much
less higher status, higher income, or greater authority than the market
would otherwise provide.
That is just as well. The professions seem to have special status,
income, and authority only when we focus on the "principal
professions", that is, law and medicine. Once we widen our view to
include the great majority-engineering,
officers, and so on-the

nursing, teaching, military

"honorific" tends to dissolve into the respect

that is due those who set a high standard of conduct for themselves, act
accordingly, and befit society in consequence. If the designation of
profession were primarily a means of "self-promotion" (as Ellin
claims), it seems to be a surprisingly poor means. MBAs and even
plumbers do better without it. That is, it seems to me, a good reason to
reject this "debunking" interpretation ofprofessions-<>ne

Ellin seems

to have derived from the sociology's economic tradition (though he
seems to think it a result of his Cartesian method).
Ellin is, I think, right that professional soldiers generally recognize the
mercenaries as belonging to the same "profession of arms" as they
do--in the occupational sense-,

that is, as fellow warriors. A

professional soldier will nonetheless distinguish himself from the
mercenary. He will point to the special standards of conduct
48
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professional soldiers do not share with mercenaries (who are, after all,
explicitly creatures of the market). He will not-as
seem to tell us to expect-point

the sociologists

to the higher pay of professional

soldiers (since mercenaries are generally paid more), nor to higher
social status (since the social status of both is pretty low and about the
same), nor even to greater authority (since mercenaries today seem to
have greater control over what they do than professional soldiers have).
One of the odd things about the sociological analysis (which Ellin
seems to endorse at the end of his comments) is how badly it fits the
facts of most professions. Those who doubt this should check it out,
starting with any professional soldier he can find.
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